Wednesday, August 30, 2006

A Brief History of DCM

Years ending in five have special significance to Donaldson Capital Management. In 1975, I (Greg) left Indiana Bell and joined a small Indianapolis-based bond firm, Traub and Company. In 1985, I entered the money management business for the first time, when I helped start Raffensperger, Hughes Investment Advisors (RHIA). A decade later in 1995, I formed Donaldson Capital Management. If you have done your math, that means I am celebrating three anniversaries this year: thirty years in the investment business, twenty years in the investment management business, and ten years in the firm bearing my name. A handful of you reading this letter have celebrated all of these anniversaries with me, others have been aboard for a shorter time, and many of you are new arrivals whom I have yet to meet. To all of you, and those who have gone before us, I want to say thank you. You have been a blessing to my family and me. You have taught me the wonder of how trust is formed in a world too full of doubt and betrayal. I thank God everyday for the privilege of serving you.

At the occasion of these multiple anniversaries, I wanted to share some of the milestones along the way that have marked and shaped the firm we are today. Although the early part of this story is mostly about my experiences in the investment business, the DCM story has moved far beyond me. Indeed, President, Mike Hull, and Vice-President of Operations, Laura Roop, run the day-to-day business. I serve as the Director of Portfolio Strategy and one of the portfolio managers.

1975 – Thirty Years Ago

When I joined Traub and Company in 1975, OPEC had just dramatically raised oil prices, stocks were in a steep decline, and inflation was exploding. To top it off, Traub and Company dealt mainly in bonds, which were about to start their worst bear market in history. None of these impediments slowed the firm a bit. Traub was full of young people in their 30s and 40s, who were incredibly focused, hard working, and collectively knew bonds better than any group of people I have ever known. We were all TnT people. We each covered a territory; we left every Tuesday morning to visit clients and returned Thursday afternoon. We called on banks, insurance companies, municipalities, and wealthy individuals – what we called professional buyers. They joked about my territory. It extended from Louisville to St. Louis and south all the way to the Gulf of Mexico. My road warrior life improved dramatically when I opened an office in Evansville, which was three hours closer to my territory than was Indianapolis.

Traub believed that to know bonds, cold, you had to know the economy, cold or hot, and they did. There are still dozens of former Traub employees inhabiting the major bond houses throughout the Midwest and South. I have maintained relationships with many of these people, and today Donaldson Capital Management buys many of its bonds from these old fashioned bond guys.

Traub knew bonds, but they were the first to admit they were not experts in stocks. In the early 1980s, I became convinced that Fed Chairman Paul Volker would tame the runaway inflation, creating a good environment for stocks, which had languished for years. I tried to convince Mr. Traub that we should build some know-how in high quality stocks, not just local issues, as was the case then. He acknowledged that a better stock market was coming, but the firm’s expertise was in bonds, and the company was already growing as fast as he felt was safe. With this in mind, I started looking around for a firm that knew stocks but also possessed a solid bond department. As I searched, I kept hearing the name Gene Tanner. He was the president of Raffensperger, Hughes, which was just down the street from Traub. Tanner was reputed to be the biggest broker in Indianapolis, and he also ran a respected firm. At first, I shied away from talking with him because he had such a big reputation in the industry. However, after interviewing a half dozen firms, including two on Wall Street, it became clear to me that if I wanted to learn from the best and stay in the Midwest, Gene Tanner was the guy to talk to.

When I met with Mr. Tanner, I told him about my desire to learn more about stocks, and asked him if I joined his firm would he help me learn. He laughed and said he would do what he could, but lately he had been thinking he needed to find someone who could teach him. I remember thinking how odd that was coming from someone with his reputation. But if I thought that was odd, what he said next was almost shocking. As we were wrapping up our meeting, I asked him if he would mind sharing with me what he thought was responsible for the success of his firm. He sat back in his chair, folded his hands, looked out the window, and said, “Being a nice person goes a long way.” And then he added, “In the long run, this business rewards honesty and integrity.”

I joined Mr. Tanner in 1981, and in some ways, I still work for him to this day. His self-deprecating way and humility are genuine and have never changed. The best news, however, is that he is still teaching me about stocks and the ways of Wall Street. This year he celebrates his 47th year in the investment business, as Vice-Chairman of NatCity Investments.

1985 – 20 Years Ago

In 1985, I served as the Director of Sales and Marketing for Raffensperger, Hughes. During the year, I worked closely with Gene on a strategic plan. The stock market was strong and bond yields were falling. I argued that the time was right for Raffensperger to start a portfolio management division. There were only a handful of true money management firms in our area, and I believed that professional management of stocks would become increasingly desirable for wealthy individuals. I cited some statistics of the time showing that in the late 1960s individuals had over 40% of their assets in stocks or mutual funds. That figure had fallen to only about 20% in the mid-1980s. The extremely high interest rates of the 1970s and early 1980s had pulled huge dollars out of stocks into bonds. Now, however, with bond yields falling rapidly, people would be pushed back to stocks, especially since President Reagan had lowered capital gains taxes. My strongest argument was this: Managing a million dollar portfolio of stocks was not possible for most people. There were just too many variables in purchase and sell decisions, and the markets were too volatile. Individual investors might have a fighting chance to develop bond management skills, but to do so in stocks called for intense study and experience, something that could get very expensive for a novice to learn.

After only a few meetings, he blessed my idea of starting a money management division, and late in 1985 Raffensperger Hughes Investment Advisors (RHIA) was born. I was the first senior officer, and by early 1986, I had assembled a small team to market our services and manage portfolios. By the middle of 1987, RHIA’s assets had grown to $30 million. Our growth had been greatly helped by stocks being up nearly 45% in the first six months of the year. That was about to change in a way no one could have imagined. At that time RHIA used what we called a B-I-G investment strategy. We invested in Big companies that were Industries leaders and whose earnings were Growing. Our buy and sell disciplines were momentum driven: ride your winners, cut your losers.

October 19, 1987, Black Monday, was surreal, agonizing, devastating, and yet, in some ways the best thing that ever happened to me. On that one day, the Dow Jones fell 23.7%, which would be equivalent to about 2500 points today. For the month of October 1987, the Dow fell nearly 30%. I wrote in my journal that I felt like the school bus driver who lost control of his bus and drove it over the cliff, losing all the children in the neighborhood.

In the days immediately following the crash, I talked with every client we had many times, trying to reassure them, but by the end of the week, I was listening to what I was saying to see if I could reassure myself. Since I had no internal compass to tell me what a stock was really worth, did I have the right to encourage people to stay in the market? Weren’t stock prices efficient, in the sense that there were millions of buyers and sellers making educated guesses about the prospects for the company? Didn’t today’s price reflect the net best guess of what the company was worth? As I said earlier, in those days, I was a momentum stock investor, and now the momentum was straight down. Yet, something inside me said the right thing to do was to buy.

The main reason for this feeling was prompted by a telephone call with a bond salesman. He explained that he needed a bid on some Indiana University bonds for a customer who insisted on selling. He said the bond market had frozen up about like the stock market. My recollection is that he had about $200,000 of the bonds and needed to sell them by the end of the day. I had a general idea of what the bonds were worth, and I had no fears of Indiana University defaulting. They were safe. Interest rates had been going through the roof in recent weeks, but the stock market crash had produced a flight to safety, causing bond prices to begin to rally. The toughest part of the IU bond was that it matured in 30 years. After thinking about it, I realized come heck or high water, if I could buy the bonds to yield 10%, I had a real bargain.
I called the guy, gave him my price, and he took it.

That night as I lay in bed, I was both enlightened and indicted. I knew how to value a bond, and even in this difficult time, I knew a good value when I saw one, and I could step up to the plate and buy it. But when it came to stocks, I had no similar way to compute intrinsic value, and not having this, I was forced to wait for the dust to clear before I got back in the market. The best I could do was to identify those companies whose financial strength and brands would likely carry them through these uncertain times.
I vowed that I would find a way to determine intrinsic value, and the next time the market was throwing away good companies at bad prices, I would be a buyer instead of a watcher. What I found in my long search for a method to determine the intrinsic value of a company has changed my whole attitude about stocks. Today, I believe the market regularly overreacts both up and down, and patiently “waiting for your price” is rewarded.

RHIA survived the crash of 1987; indeed, we seemed to have benefited from it. In the wake of the crash, almost all the brokers and clients at Raffensperger, Hughes were totally confused. Since we were the firm’s money managers, it seemed only right that we would be called on to make sense of what was going on. We spoke on daily conference calls, calls with important clients, and fielded hundreds of questions from our money management clients. We told everyone who would listen the truth as we believed it to be: stocks were probably overpriced heading into the crash, but Black Monday was a financial accident caused by computerized trading at big Wall Street firms. We explained that the economy appeared to be relatively unaffected, so earnings should hold together. But, we concluded that the stock market was unlikely to quickly regain the losses it had sustained until investors were confident that such an accident would not happen again. As it turned out, most of our assessment of what had caused Black Monday was on target, but the market turned around much faster than we had guessed. In 1988, the S&P 500 grew by almost 17%. Our forecast was for less than half that figure. Why did the market turn so quickly? The main reason was that the biggest, most knowledgeable investors already understood that stocks had intrinsic value and how to compute it. Thus, they knew America was on sale at bargain prices and they bought.

From 1988 through 1993 RHIA’s clients and assets grew rapidly. We returned to our B-I-G investment strategy and our performance exceeded the benchmarks for the period. We did start a “value style” of investment management that used dividend-paying stocks, but it had few assets and no real emphasis. The rapid growth, in retrospect, was not a blessing. We found that we did not have the people or the systems to accommodate the growth, which caused our level of customer service to fall dramatically. I personally had more complaints of poor service during that time than at any time in my career. The complaints caught me by surprise, because our investment performance had been good, and I had always thought that was priority #1. I was about to learn the rest of the story, good client service might be hard for people to describe, but they know it when they are not getting it.

But the news would get worse. Our rapid growth had caught the eye of The Associated Group, a large affiliate of Blue Cross-Blue Shield, who owned Raffensperger, Hughes. The Associated Group spun RHIA out of Raffensperger, Hughes, merged it with their investment department, and renamed the entity Anthem Capital Management. RHIA had about $160 million of assets under management and eight employees before the merger. The new entity had over $2 billion under management and over 80 employees. Anthem started a trust company and a family of mutual funds, including a rising dividend fund that I managed. I had long believed that trusts, mutual funds, and investment management were natural partners. With these three service offerings, a large firm like Anthem could provide investment management to almost anyone. We were one of the first non-bank companies in the nation to put these three investment products under one roof. I have always said that Anthem got the “head” part of the business right, but they forgot the “heart.”

That deficiency in matters of the heart became increasingly apparent, and in short order, I knew that Anthem was not for me. One of the first indications was a change in our motto. RHIA’s motto of Discipline, Patience, and Humility was discarded as too corny. The beginning of our mission statement, which hung on the wall in our entry way, was changed from, “. . .[O]ur ultimate business is trust” to “[We] will earn a return on equity consistent with the leading firms. . .” The next clue came when a brochure appeared on my desk with a long quote attributed to me. The quote was not mine, and it was not something I would ever say. The final straw occurred in October of 1994 at our weekly investment strategy meeting. My title was Director of Economic Strategy. My primary responsibility was to develop an investment strategy for managing our bonds and other interest-sensitive securities. At the weekly investment strategy meeting I provided an overview of the economy and Federal Reserve policy and set guidelines for the quality and length of maturity of the bonds that we were buying.

1994 had been a tough year for bonds. Inflation had ticked up and the Fed was aggressively pushing interest rates higher. In December of 1993, long-term treasury bonds had yielded 5.75%, but here in October they yielded over 8%. I had been saying for several months that interest rates were much higher than they should be, based on historical relationships with inflation, and I expected them to fall. For this reason, I was advocating buying long-term bonds. Setting interest rate policy was my call. It was subject to debate, and everyone had an opportunity to offer their own views, but in the end, my job description said I set the policy. The debate at that October meeting was not pretty. I was reminded of having been wrong about the market for several months, believing too much in Alan Greenspan, and being bullheaded about it. Everyone is entitled to their opinions, but I knew few of the other five members of the investment policy committee had any idea where interest rates were going. They were mostly worried because bond prices had been falling for months, and indeed, they were starting to catch some worried questions from our clients. I had learned a lot about bonds and the economy from my days at Traub, but I had learned something even more valuable for negotiating tough times from Gene Tanner. He had always said, “Get the fundamentals right. In the short run, prices can go anywhere, and they will; but in the long run, they will follow the fundamentals. If you don’t have the fundamentals right, you’ll faint when you should be fighting.” There was no doubt in my mind that I had the fundamentals right, and therefore, I was not about to change my opinion to appease the other members of the committee, who I thought were in the process of fainting.

Because my view was seen to be in the minority, the chairman decided to take a vote. I do not know if he realized it, but in taking the vote on something that was clearly my decision, on a de facto basis, I was being relieved of my authority. Among the six votes, mine was the only one for my recommendation. As I looked around the room, I realized I had been outvoted by fear. Almost everyone had advanced degrees in business, one even had a national reputation, but I knew fear was whispering in their ears and not the principles of economics that they had learned.

1995 – 10 Years Ago

Donaldson Capital Management was conceived that same day on the long drive home to Evansville. It may seem as though I was responding like a sore loser, but there was something inside of me that was elevated more than my ire. It was as though I was lifted above the situation and saw it for what it was, and what I saw troubled me: I did not trust these people. They had put words in my mouth on the brochure and acted like it was nothing. They had rewritten the mission statement to put their own rate of return as their #1 priority, rather than their clients’ well being. But, most troubling to me was the realization that on this day they had bushwhacked one of their own.

At moments like these, it pays to have a friend and mentor like Gene Tanner. When Anthem Capital had been spun out of Raffensperger Hughes, he had remained as Raffensperger’s president. We had spent only a few minutes discussing the situation, when he said, “Come back here and start your own firm. You can do it, and I’ll help you. We’ve got extra space and technology. Just bring your own people and you’re in business.” Roughly 60 days later it was done . . . about the same time interest rates started a downtrend that would last almost 10 years. Within a year, almost all the people who had gone to Anthem from RHIA had left.

One of the first thoughts I had upon the forming of Donaldson Capital Management was how to get Mike Hull to leave Bristol Myers and join me. Mike was my best friend, and I had been recruiting him for a decade; but his ship just kept getting farther away from me, as he rose in the ranks of Bristol’s Mead Johnson Nutritionals division. After a two-year stint in China, he was now the Marketing Director for infant formula, a billion dollar plus product line. Mike and I had met on a three-day spiritual retreat in 1982, and even though we did not know each other, he and his family started attending our church shortly thereafter. Our kids became best friends first, and that led to our families beginning to spend time together at church and socially. I really got to know him over many years of walking the beach at Destin, Florida, where our families vacationed together each fall during the 1980s.

I had been recruiting Mike for such a long time because he had been in the investment management business earlier in his career, and before joining Bristol Myers, he had been the president of a small health-care products company. From all of those walks along the beach, I knew the job he had enjoyed the most was running the small firm. Our families had celebrated the year he was able to get his company’s eye-care solutions in Wal-Mart and Walgreen. I knew he had left the company to go to Bristol Myers mainly for the security a large firm offered his young family. But that security was coming at a stiff price. As he had moved higher in the organization, the choices were becoming less attractive: continue moving up and give the company more of his life or sit still and wait for Bristol to say they no longer needed him, like they were doing with so many others.

Most people knew Mike, at that time, as a bright and competitive executive, but I knew the brightest thing about him was his heart. I knew countless examples where Mike had gone out of his way to help someone in need, but there was one incident that I stumbled onto that left me speechless. I saw him in the cloak room of our church one Sunday after the service with two big bags of groceries. It was early summer and I knew of no food drives or church functions that would require him to bring groceries to church, so I asked him where the food was going. After some stalling, he finally admitted that he was taking the food to someone he had met in our Christmas food drive. He said, “You know, it occurred to me that that guy might get hungry at times other than Christmas.” Then he turned and left.

It was that heart that I wanted to work along side of and learn from. It was that heart, and the head that came with it, that I wanted to manage our little firm.

King Traub was the head of Traub and Company. He was a bigger-than-life type of character, and a genius at salesmanship. I can still hear him say, “No is not an answer that means no forever. It just means not now. Ask tomorrow and again next week, and keep asking until they tell you don’t ask again. Then ask them when you can ask again.”

I had followed King’s counsel to the letter in trying to hire Mike. He had told me no for a decade, but I knew his job with Bristol was wearing on him, so I decided to try him again. My sales pitch to Mike was simple: Come and join me. I will take care of the investments; you take care of running the firm. We will become as big as you decide. I can offer you about half of your present salary, but I can provide you with security that you will never have at Bristol Myers, because at Bristol, there will always come a day when they say goodbye, and that will never happen with me (I had borrowed this line of thinking from him). We need to add people. How many is up to you, and you have to figure out how to pay for them, but we need to grow. To my surprise he said yes. I remember saying something like, “Are you sure? You’d be giving up a lot of income.” (King would not have been proud of this approach.) He explained that he was sure, but he had some things that he needed to finish at Mead Johnson, and he could not join me for a year.

Mike joined our firm in February of 1997. He said he would like to study our business, the industry, and get to know our clients before he officially started to run the company. Near the end of 1997, he said he was ready to talk. The following is an excerpt of what he shared during the next few weeks:

There is a disconnect between what our industry thinks is most important to the clients and what the clients think. The Financial Services industry thinks that investment performance is the most important ingredient, but the clients think it is a trusting relationship and good service. Put another way, Wall Street thinks it’s all about how smart or savvy they are -- the head -- while what the clients want is someone who cares – the heart. To make matters worse, Wall Street keeps the investment selection process a closely guarded secret, shrouded in mystery and complexity, which has the effect of holding clients at arms length, when the client’s want to feel like they are a part of the process.

But the clients also are making a mistake. In their desire to find a trusting relationship, they often sacrifice a lot in investment performance. In essence, they pay too high a price for service and simplicity. The best examples of this are Certificates of Deposit and Fixed Annuities. These financial products are simple, usually sold by someone the clients knows, and do not fluctuate in price. What could be wrong with this? Nothing, if you are trying to share the wealth, but plenty if you are trying to live off of your assets for the rest of your life. Based on historical returns, at the rate of inflation, money will double in about 20 years, compared with almost an eight-fold increase in common stocks and almost a four-fold increase in corporate bonds.

Investors deserve a new model for financial services relationships. Let’s call it a heart and head strategy. The number one priority of our firm should be client satisfaction. To the clients that means a trusting relationship and good service. The way to accomplish this is to build a staff of people whose sole function is to respond to our clients’ questions, needs and concerns. These people should not be clerks. They should be smart, well-trained, friendly, and possess a servant’s heart. Our clients should be almost surprised by how well they are treated and how knowledgeable these client services people are. The goal should be to have our client services people on a first name basis with every client we have and be able to handle their needs on the first call. The heart of our business, unlike most investment firms, will be trust building through surprisingly good customer service.

Next, we must make the head part of our business, the investment process, more understandable and more transparent. We need to get our heads out of the investment clouds, look our clients in the eyes, and tell them what we are doing and why. We need to let them look over our shoulders and help them to see what we see. We need to show them that, even though what we do may not be simple, it is sensible, understandable, and has solid prospects for success. We should teach our clients the basics of how to value a company so that when increased volatility inevitably comes, they can see through it to the true value of a company, and not be drawn in or pushed out at precisely the wrong moment.

For these reasons, we should place more emphasis on the Dividend Strategy. There are very few people who have gone as far into dividends as you have, and I am convinced that the dividend strategy produces investment returns as good as or better than the market with far less volatility. But if we keep it to ourselves, we are doing the same thing that everybody else in the Financial Services industry is doing: mystifying the investment process and keeping our clients at arm’s length. If we are a heart-first company, we need to share what we have learned about dividends, especially as it relates to determining what a company is worth. For our clients’ wellbeing as well as our own, we need to teach them that the current selling price of a stock is almost never what it is really worth. We have simply got to get them out of the business of valuing their portfolios using their monthly statements or a website. There is very little correlation between what a company is selling for today and what it will be selling for next year or five years from now. On the contrary, we know in many cases, there is an 80%-90% correlation between dividend growth and price in a year or five years. In every way we can, we must get this information out to our clients and help them understand it.

Mike concluded with a far-reaching thought. “Over the next twenty years, more people than ever before will be retiring with a fixed sum of money that must last them the rest of their lives. Unless they become investors instead of speculators, and unless they learn how to invest for income as opposed to purely capital gains, retirement will be a nightmare for them. Our job is to reach them and share our story.

Over the past six years, we have been implementing Mike’s strategy for our firm. We promoted Laura Roop to Vice President of Operations and Client Services. Carol Stumpf is now the Director of Client Services. Laura and Carol, along with their fellow teammates, Tom Piper, Beth Dietsch, and Ciavon Fetcher, are the people Mike envisioned who would possess good heads and great hearts. All of these people have been with us for at least four years. Rick Roop, Laura’s husband, joined us as a third portfolio manager, and we are talking to yet another candidate. We have added a technology specialist to our staff, and we have added software that helps us measure the quantity and quality of our client interactions. We have simplified our investment management styles, and now everything we do in stocks is dividend oriented. We have written extensively about our ongoing dividend research and tried hard to make this understandable to our clients, new and old. Finally, we have added a process that assures each of our portfolios is as close to our “best idea” model portfolio as possible.

Today, Donaldson Capital Management serves nearly 300 families in 28 states and the District of Columbia with total assets approaching $300 million. Indiana continues to be the state where we have the most clients, but we have a growing presence in Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Arkansas, Alabama, and Florida. We have relationships with over 40 brokers throughout these areas who refer business to us. Brokers in the South have been referring clients at such a pace that we plan on opening an office in either Nashville or Birmingham, during the next quarter.

That is the Donaldson Capital Management story as of today. I am very confident that there will be many more chapters in the coming years. I have said little about the role clients have played in our history. Many of you have humbled us with your unfailing trust in the tough times we have faced together. You have sent your friends to talk with us, your children, and your children’s children. You have honored us by asking us to help you work through difficult estate questions. We hold no illusions that we built this company with our own hands. Our clients’ fingerprints are all over everything we do. Even the idea to start a portfolio management company in 1985 came from a client. I also want to recognize the great contributions made by former partners, Tom Lynch and Wayne Ramsey. We rode together for many years, and they added immeasurably to my understanding of both investments, as well as the investment business.

Wednesday, May 10, 2006

The Three Buckets of Retirement Income

If you watched the NCAA basketball championships, you probably had your fill of dumb-guy beer commercials that remind you of somebody you knew back when. You have been mentally drained by ads for fast, smart cars that offer the eternal promise of making someone who is neither, both. Finally, you can now lip sync the never-ending ads from the financial services industry that promise to make your retirement decisions as simple as a walk in the park.

A wise man once said that people do not choose products and services that they want or need but products that fit the image of who they think they are. That might work when you are trying to keep up with the Joneses, but when it comes to retirement planning, taking the route that Madison Avenue thinks best can be disastrous.

In one ad, the Hartford Insurance Company touts their retirement-planning expertise by having an elk walk past a long trophy case of admiring figurines and out into an empty basketball arena. The voiceover is extolling the underlying theme of trust. Whom are we supposed to trust: a wild animal that has lost its way and wandered into a public building, or an insurance company that believes retirement planning is as easy to produce as the computerized image of an elk? On the other hand, maybe we should trust Merrill Lynch’s bull . . . or maybe not. That bull looks a lot like the same one that we were supposed to follow during the internet stampede. In addition, a website that explains what “Total Merrill” means has the following quote:

“Since there is uncertainty and fear associated with retirement, the Retirement
Visualizer (the Total Merrill ad campaign) will expose users obliquely to the various concepts related to retirement and get at their true feelings and motivations apart from any misconceptions or other ‘baggage’ they may bring with them.”

Okay, that explains everything. It’s one of those “baggage” things. Next thing you know, one of the big financial services companies will bring back the yellow smiley-face and tell us: “Don’t worry. Be happy.”

The Elephant in the Room

Retirement planning for most people is an “elephant in the room” – a question or problem that obviously needs tackling, but is being avoided for the benefit of one or the other party. Because Madison Avenue and Wall Street think people are too afraid and carry too much baggage to tackle it, they want to “obliquely” talk around it and offer up pacifiers and cuteness instead of education and illumination. They say “trust us,” instead of “here are the facts.” They utter benign condescension instead of clarity of thinking.

We have written these quarterly letters for 20 years. We have three filters for what goes in these pages: Is it true? Can we explain it? Is this the one thing that our clients need to hear? To all three of these questions our answer concerning the retirement dilemma is a resounding “Yes.” The time is right, no matter what your age, to look the elephant squarely in the eyes and begin the process of understanding the questions it asks. Because when you do, you will begin to understand what is real and what is an advertising slogan, what you can live with, and what you might be better living without.

We have titled this letter The Three Buckets of Retirement Income. We see those buckets as the answer to the elephant in the room. There is nothing cute or cuddly about a bucket. It is just a container. It has few purposes other than to hold something. As we view the retirement planning strategies offered by Madison Avenue and Wall Street, we see that they are long on “peace of mind” investing but short on how you get there and what you can reasonably expect. The reason is simple – and this is the essence of the “elephant in the room.” Building retirement portfolios that can stand the test of time is very complex, and it cannot be conjured up by some computer-generated model. Things have to work out right for each individual before much peace of mind will bloom, and as we will show, there are no “one decision” investment alternatives at present that offer enough income to allow you to just put the whole matter to bed.

In the following pages, we will lay out the investment alternatives available today, as well as the long-term average returns for each investment class, to give you an order of magnitude for what is probable in the future, as well as possible now.

A One-Bucket Approach: Fixed Income

Let us see what we can expect from the fixed income or bond bucket. In all of our examples, we will assume that you are the proud recipient of a lump sum retirement check of $1 million. That is a lot of money. There ought to be a long list of investment alternatives that can provide a solid living income for a person with that much money. Indeed, there are thousands of investment vehicles, but they each fall into only one of three classes of securities: cash equivalents, fixed income, or equities.

In analyzing the investment options, we will not take into consideration taxes, fees, or the fact that the timing of purchases can change rates of returns dramatically. We are not trying to etch our plan in stone. We are simply trying to provide our educated guess of what the future might look like. In doing so, we are leaning heavily on historical long-term trends.

Short-Term Fixed Income

Let’s look at what a million dollars will generate in cash equivalents. Short-term, no risk alternatives such as Treasury Bills and certificates of deposit have averaged just under 4.0% over the last 80 years. Today they are yielding near 4.5%. By historical standards, short-term interest rates would appear to be a bargain. The only problem is short-term money is short term, and we have little doubt that over the next 20 years or so, T-Bills and CDs will trend toward their long-term average of 3.5% to 4%.

After adjusting for inflation, you would be making little or nothing because inflation has averaged near 3.5% over the last 80 years. In addition, over the last 25 years, short-term rates have been as high as 10% and as low as 1%. If the future is anything like the past, this wide fluctuation in annual interest rates would also mean wide fluctuations in annual income. On an investment of $1 million, that would mean annual income would have been as high as $100,000 and as low as $10,000, with the average being somewhere around $40,000.

In our judgment, this would make income planning impossible and peace of mind in short supply. We believe staying in short-term investments with a large portion of your assets is not a viable option. It places such a high premium on liquidity and preserving capital that it does not allow for a living income, which we believe must be predictable, safe, and if possible, growing.

Long-Term Fixed Income

Longer-maturity US Treasury and highly rated corporate bonds have averaged near 6.0% over the last 80 years. While top-quality bonds have recently been yielding 6.0%, longer-term, high-quality bond yields have been moving up in recent months, and we would not be surprised to see them move even higher, unless inflation falls sharply. Since it is possible to obtain 6% yields from lesser quality bonds, and since the long-term average is 6%, we will use that figure for our computations. [double click to increase size]



Table I gives us our first glance at what living out of a fixed income bucket might look like. Because a long-term bond is a form of a contract, we know far into the future how much income our portfolio will produce. If we bought a 20-year non-callable bond with the million dollars, we would know exactly how much we would earn over the next 20 years. We do not recommend that, but history shows us that long-term bonds have provided higher inflation-adjusted returns than short-term investments, and these returns are far more predictable.

From a “living income” perspective, long-term bonds provide predictable income that we believe is safe, but has little chance of keeping pace with inflation. Indeed, a look at column D shows that our purchasing power steadily erodes over time. We think this is a much more troubling situation than you might think. Retirement communities, extended-stay nursing home facilities, and healthcare costs, in general, are rising faster than the average rate of inflation. That means, as you grow older, your health care costs will be rising as your inflation-adjusted income is falling. For this reason, let us move on to another one-bucket approach to see if we can improve our situation.

Before we go there, let us issue a special word of caution regarding annuities. We have seen numerous proposals for annuities that are nothing but a come-on. We are speaking here of annuities that are annuitized (an investor pays a sum of money in return for a lifetime series of monthly payments). We recently spoke with a retiring executive who was offered a 7% return for the rest of his life. That sounds like a good deal until you take into consideration that to get it he has to give up his million dollars. He will receive the $70,000 per year for life, but after he and his wife die, the assets will go to the insurance company. According to government life-expectancy tables, his life expectancy is approximately 20 years. Seventy thousand dollars a year for 20 years has an internal rate of return of 3.4%. This is a terrible deal, but there are a lot of them being offered to people who have difficulty understanding how to evaluate these products.

A One-Bucket Approach: Capital Appreciation from Stocks

Long-term bonds offer better living income than short-term investments, but with bonds, we are always going to be dealing with the loss of purchasing power over a long period. The only way to get around the purchasing power issue is to buy something where the value is going up. Stocks would seem to be a natural here. The total return for Blue Chip common stocks has averaged just over 10% per year for the last 80 years. If we could consistently take a 10% gain each year from stocks, that would obviously generate substantially more income than long-term bonds. We might even get lucky and make more than 10% in some years.

Whoever said you should never mix the words lucky and retirement in the same sentence must have seen our next table. Even though stocks have averaged a 10% rate of return over the long term, the 10% is anything but consistent. [Double click to increase size]


Table II shows a busted retirement program. During the hot years of the late 1990s, the value of the account rose to over $1.7 million, and annual distributions reached $170,000. It has been downhill from there. Indeed, today the value of the account is 20% less than it was 10 years ago, as is the annual distribution. The 10% annual distribution has been greater than the amount earned in five of the ten years.

A lot of money has been pulled out of the portfolio, but it was not earned, and thus was depleting principal. The internal rate of return during this period was more than 9%, but our calculations show that, in order to maintain the integrity of the principal, no more than an annual distribution of approximately 7% could have safely been taken from the account. At first, that may not make sense, but it has to do with the pounding the stock market took in the early 2000s. There are those who say that the three-year bear market may have been like a 100-year flood and is not likely to come again. The problem is, however, there are no guarantees in stocks and trying to live entirely off capital gains, year in and year out, subjects you to the possibility of a busted retirement plan like the one in Table II.

Putting all of your money in stocks, while good in the long run, is almost the antithesis of our concept of living income. The income is not predictable; the principal may be at risk; and it does nothing to deal with the loss of purchasing power. We do not think a stocks-only retirement plan is right for all but the most seasoned of investors. Yet, the startling truth is many of the retirement plans that we see being offered by so-called “retirement planning specialists” have only a token quantity of fixed income securities. Instead, they rely on the illusion that spreading risk among stocks, globally, by capitalization, and by sector can avoid another 100-year wash out.


The Three-Bucket Approach: Fixed Income, Rising Income, and Capital Appreciation

We are convinced that a one-bucket approach of all bonds or stocks subjects a retired person to either a stable stream of income with declining purchasing power or a completely unstable and unpredictable reliance on capital appreciation, both of which will be difficult for most people to stomach.

So, if a one-bucket approach does not work, would a two-bucket approach, relying on some fixed income from bonds and the capital appreciation from stocks, make sense? We believe this two-bucket approach makes more sense than either of the one-bucket approaches but still has some shortcomings. This is because growth stocks produce very little income, which means that almost all of the living income must come from the bonds. Consequently, to achieve an acceptable level of income you are still left with the difficult task of deciding how much capital gains to take (and when) to augment the income from the bonds. In actual practice, our experience tells us that while a two-bucket approach, using bonds and growth stocks, has merit, it subjects people’s “living income” to more risk than they might imagine.

So, if a one-bucket approach has significant problems and a two-bucket approach still has many unknowns, what will work? We call the solution a Three-Bucket Strategy.

At first, the Three-Bucket Strategy may seem a lot like the just-discussed two-bucket strategy because it uses stocks and bonds. The big difference is that instead of using growth stocks and bonds we use rising dividend stocks and bonds, and this makes all the difference. Even though rising dividend stocks are still stocks, they have bond-like qualities. They possess solid financial strength, higher-than-average dividend yield, and a high probability of future dividend growth. All of these characteristics taken together allow us to separate their stock and bond benefits into two buckets – an income bucket and a capital appreciation bucket.

The Three-Bucket Strategy, then, consists of a bucket containing the fixed income from bonds, a bucket containing the rising dividends from stocks, and a bucket holding the capital appreciation created from our rising dividends.

Table III shows, for a 50/50 allocation between bonds and rising dividend stocks, each of the three buckets and how they work together. Bucket # 1 collects a steady and predictable stream of income from bonds or other fixed income securities. Bucket #2 receives a steadily rising stream of income from well established dividend paying stocks. In the table, we are using a dividend yield of 3.2% and dividend growth of 7%, which have been our actual long-term averages. Bucket #3 receives the long-term capital appreciation from the stocks. It certainly will not be as regular as shown, but there is a very high probability, if we do our job right, that capital appreciation will accumulate in Bucket # 3. When appreciation does occur, a part of it is sold and the proceeds put back into Bucket # 1. This keeps the stock-bond ratio in line and increases portfolio income because bonds pay higher income than stocks.


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Endowment Investment Strategy – Three Buckets for Real

The last table we want to show you details the actual results of our Endowment style of investment management. Years ago, we coined the name after repeatedly hearing from our not-for-profit clients that they wanted the greatest amount of income they could achieve; they wanted the income to grow at least at the rate of inflation, and they did not want to tap their principal. If you think about it, that is what most of us want in retirement. You will see that the Endowment investment style uses the three-bucket approach. For purposes of illustration, our example is showing a 50/50 split between stocks and bonds. Careful analysis of each person’s situation often pushes the balance toward more stocks or more bonds, but the 50/50 split will give you a good idea of how our three-bucket approach has performed over the last 10 years.



We believe there are three key elements to Table IV that show the how the three-bucket approach answers the living income question.

1. The income is reasonably predictable. In looking at what really happened during an extraordinarily volatile time, not only for stocks but also for interest rates, the Total Income (lighter shaded column) has trended higher, even though the yield on both stocks and bonds has fallen.

2. It is safe. The bond income was produced entirely from investment grade bonds and similar fixed income securities. History shows us that bonds of that quality have an incredibly low default rate. The dividend income was produced by companies that passed stringent tests of financial strength, dividend history, and projected growth.

3. The income and principal are rising. What is remarkable is that during a time when interest rates fell by as much as 30%, the income generated by the portfolio actually rose. How this happened is not entirely explained by Table IV. What you don’t see is that the capital appreciation from the rising dividend stocks was being regularly converted into bonds to maintain the 50/50 stock-bond mix. So, even while interest rates were falling, the transfer of assets from stocks to bonds was enough to allow the Total Portfolio Income to grow. In addition, because this transfer from stocks to bonds happened primarily in up years for the stock market, the effects of the down years were cushioned and allowed the Total Portfolio Value (darker shaded column) to keep growing.


As you can see, tackling the elephant in the room is not about “feel good” and “be happy.” It’s really about math, knowing what is probable and possible, and understanding the investment dynamics of portfolio management.

We have poked fun at the financial services industry and how lightly they are treating what we consider to be a very serious matter – retirement planning and investing. We recognize that you took a lifetime to accumulate your retirement assets. Just as importantly, those assets will have to support you and your family for a long, long time. There is nothing trivial about this. Maybe that’s why we are so committed to getting out the story of the three buckets of retirement income. The story is true. It’s understandable. And, people need to hear it.


Blessings,

Greg Donaldson Mike Hull

Tuesday, March 28, 2006

The Quality Doesn't Matter Phenomenon

Standard and Poors recently reported that 2005 was an upside-down year. Their research shows that, in general, the higher the quality of the company the poorer it performed in the year just past. In addition, the smaller the company the better it likely performed. Since when did quality not matter? S&P cited their own research that shows over the long run companies with the highest earnings and dividend quality ratings have outperformed lower quality companies by a wide margin.

But why would “quality” not matter -- especially in a time of increasing globalization, geopolitical risks, rising interest rates, and spiking oil prices? Coincidently, we spent an entire investment policy meeting on this very subject earlier this year. We did not have S&P’s statistics then, but we could see widespread evidence that small stocks were doing better than large stocks. Our conclusion was that the relative out-performance of smaller and less creditworthy companies was a function of the strength of the US economy. The primary reason for that conclusion was that our research showed a similar quality-doesn’t-matter occurrence in bonds; where the yield spread between AAA and junk-rated bonds was also well below normal. We concluded that even though many people (particularly the media) were not buying how strong the US economy was, that US stocks and bonds certainly were.

We started studying this quality-doesn’t-matter phenomenon because we have just been mystified as to why the outstanding business performances of many of the companies we own had largely been ignored. Our world is entirely contained within the so-called investment-grade universe of companies, and those companies were exhibiting three almost universal characteristics: 1. Earning growth that was much higher than the average of the last five years; 2. Dividend growth that was perhaps as good as we have ever seen; 3. Our valuation models were showing most of our companies were 15%-20% undervalued, using statistical relationships between dividend growth and price.

Actually, we were not complaining because these high quality companies were seldom on sale, and we have been nibbling all year, but the strong performance of companies that would never make it through our “quality door” gave us pause. S&P’s recent comments about quality and performance, combined with our own research showing the remarkable narrowing of the yield spread between AAA bonds and junk bonds, produced a kind of “what’s wrong with this picture” among the members of our investment policy committee. This resulted in the following line of thinking: What kind of environment causes riskier companies to perform much better than normal? Answer: when risks are perceived to be low. When are risks to companies low? Answer: when interest rates are low and the economy is strong and expanding. Are interest rates likely to stay low and will the economy continue to grow at near 4%? Answer: no and no.

If our line of thinking is correct, a change in the notion that quality-doesn’t-matter is at hand because we are absolutely convinced that the Federal Reserve’s goal is to slow economic growth to 3% from 4%, and they will drive interest rates wherever they deem necessary to accomplish their goal. A one percent slow down in the economy doesn’t sound like much, but remember it is one percent on 4%, or actually a 25% slowing. That magnitude of slowing will hurt many companies, and it will disproportionately hurt smaller more highly-leveraged companies whose business is mostly in the US; the very companies that the market is currently smitten with.

But doesn’t the slowing economy mean that all companies will suffer? The short and long answers are both “No.” There are three reasons: 1. The typical high quality company that is in our portfolios produces almost 50% of their earnings outside the US. Thus, the slowdown we see coming will be less pronounced among our companies. 2. While the US economy is slowing, economists we follow are forecasting that the rest of the world’s economic growth will be accelerating in 2006. 3. This means that not only will our companies be less affected by the slowing US economy the 50% of their earnings outside the US is likely to be accelerating, which would add to their appeal relative to small domestic companies.

Our research can find few instances where the current quality-does-not matter phenomenon lasted for an extended time. We can find even fewer occasions when quality has actually been a negative, as has been the case in the last 18 months. For these reasons, we believe the current situation cannot last and, indeed, there are signs that the worm is already turning. Since the first of the year, our portfolios have been outperforming the major indexes and, on a total return basis, they have already grown more in the first two and a half months than they did all of 2005. We will keep you informed of their progress in the coming months.

As we said earlier, dividend increases over the past twelve months may have been the best the Rising Income portfolio has ever produced, and we are sure that the portfolio’s dividend growth over the last three years is the best three-year period ever. Currently, there are 27 companies in our model portfolio, which have an average current dividend yield of 3.3%. The big news is that dividend growth over the last twelve months has been 11.6%, with Toyota, Nestle, United Technologies, and Colgate leading the way with dividend increases averaging well over 20%. Dividend increases over the last three years have averaged 10.4%, with Toyota, Cincinnati Financial, Wachovia, Wells Fargo, and United Technologies putting up 20% plus growth.

To compute the total dividend return over the past three years, we add the average dividend yield of 3.3% to the average growth of 10.4% to get 13.7%. During the last three years, the actual total return of the portfolio has been significantly less that this figure, and that is where the valuation gap occurs. Over the last 20 years, on average, the stocks in our portfolio have had a near 90% correlation between dividend growth and price growth. Our models currently indicate that the average stock in our portfolio is 15% undervalued. Our models also indicate that the greatest cause of the valuation gap is the portfolios’ performance over the last year. We believe this is a direct result of the quality-doesn’t-matter phenomenon we discussed earlier, but will change as earnings among smaller companies come up short.

The old saying that goes, “Eventually the cream rises to the top”. Old sayings become old because they are true. We own the cream of the crop. You know the rest.

Monday, March 06, 2006

Donaldson Capital's General Dividend Strategy: Part I

Rising dividends have power. But, their power is largely hidden because most people don’t know where to look for it. Understood properly, the hidden qualities of rising dividends can afford investors an unobstructed view beyond today’s fluctuating prices into the underlying values of an individual stock and the overall market. In this letter, we will identify some of these hidden qualities and how we use them for investment analysis and selection. Dividends are becoming a more familiar subject among investors, but judging from the articles we have read in the mainstream media, the public is still primarily interested in high dividend yield, with dividend growth running a distant second. It is natural that high dividend yield investing would get the most attention. It is easy to understand. The formula for current dividend yield is very straight forward:



For example, Bank of America (BAC) pays a dividend of $2.00 and is selling at $45.00 per share, producing a current dividend yield of 4.44%. Although a yield of 4.44% is attractive, particularly in a world where a 10-year US Treasury Bond yields just over 4.0%, our research shows conclusively that it is the combination of dividend yield and dividend growth that offers the greatest rewards. BAC is one of our favorite stocks, but we like it for important reasons beyond its current dividend yield. Indeed, if its current dividend yield were all we could expect over the next 10 years, we would buy the Treasury bond because it is backed by the full faith and credit of the US government, while BAC’s dividend is not guaranteed and could be cut to zero next week without violating any laws.

Quality Door

It is important to remember that dividends are not a legal obligation; they are paid at the sole discretion of the board of directors of the company. That is why, even though we invest only in stocks that pay dividends, our investment selection process does not start by going through the “Dividend Door.” That process starts through the “Quality Door.” By this we mean that all of our potential portfolio holdings must possess solid creditworthiness before we will even look at them from a dividend perspective. Indeed, the first question we ask about companies we are considering is -- would we loan them money? We expect to own most of the companies we buy for many years. Over time, some sort of bad news inevitably hits all companies. We want to be sure that the companies we own can take these hits and continue on without coming apart. The idea that you can jump in and out of stocks and avoid the hits is widespread among investors today and is simply not true. We can cite countless examples of where bad news has hit a company without warning, severely testing the financial and management resources of the organization for years, and never giving traders a prayer of getting their money back.

Most high-yield dividend stocks we see touted in the media can not pass through the quality door. We think they are an accident waiting to happen. The companies are using high dividends just to keep investors happy, but they are, essentially, liquidating their companies by paying out more than they can afford. When the inevitable bad news comes, their high dividend will be the first thing to go.

If we were to reduce our investment selection process to one sentence it would be:

We seek to own companies with unquestioned financial strength that pay a generous dividend and promise superior dividend growth in the future.

The word dividend comes from the French word, dividere, meaning, to cut. Dividends are literally your “cut” of the company’s profits, and herein lies the first hidden value of rising dividend investing: In selected companies, dividends go up almost every year. Indeed, in the last 45 years, the cumulative dividends of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) have risen 37 times and fallen only 8 times. Few people are aware just how stable the dividends of some major companies really are. Another hidden value is that for the DJIA, the steadily rising dividends have not only represented nearly 40% of the DJIA's total investment return, they have also provided an important gauge for determining the value of the DJIA itself. We will elaborate on this idea later.

Yield at Cost

The current dividend yield of a stock whose dividend is stable is easily understood. You do not even need to know the formula because it is computed for you and shown in most financial publications for every stock. When you look at BAC in the paper or at an online financial site, it will look something like this:

Name>>>Price>>> High>>> Low>>> Volume>>> PE>>> Dividend Yield
BAC >>>>45 >>>>46.25>>> 44.15>>> 300,000 >12>>>> 2.00>>> 4.4

But, understanding the value of a rising dividend is much tougher and techniques to assist you in doing so are almost totally absent in today’s media. One approach we use to uncover this hidden value is the concept of “Yield at Cost.” Yield at Cost is the current dividend divided by your original purchase price. Yield at Cost is quite revealing once you understand how to use it. Let us show a Yield at Cost analysis for BAC.

Most investors look only at price. Some might look at PE or yield, but almost no one will look at the most important data on the line, dividend. Let’s say you bought BAC ten years ago. Table 1 on the next page shows that in 1995 you would have paid $14.53 per share for BAC. Dividing the current dividend of $2.00 by your original purchase price, we find that your Yield at Cost is 13.77%. This is a remarkable cash on cash return, yet no financial publication in the world can show it to you, because it is yours and yours alone.

Looking at Table 1, you will see that in 1995 BAC paid a dividend of $.52, which produced a dividend yield of 3.58%. Over the last 10 years, however, the company has raised its dividend every year and today pays $2.00, almost four times what it paid in 1995. Please note that BAC’s current yield, as would have been reported in the media, ranged between 2.25% and 4.44% (Column F). Your Yield at Cost, which Column G shows was rising every year, would have been completely hidden from you, unless you understood the concept. Let’s look at Table 1 to see other important features of dividend investing.

Please double click the table to enlarge it.



If you are like most people, who look only at price, you wake up every morning saying, “Should I sell my BAC and take my profit, or should I wait for another day when it might be higher?” Our guess is that most price-only investors who bought BAC in 1995 had a very tough time holding the stock in the late 1990s. The stock went flat from 1997 through 2002 (Column E), at a time when the investment world became inebriated with tech stocks. Yet, even though BAC’s price was going nowhere, its dividend and underlying value were increasing by double digits every year. BAC’s dividend went from $.69 in 1997 to a $1.22 in 2002. That is nearly an 80% increase in cash distributions and the price hardly moved. That alone should have been a warning that something was amiss with the market’s valuation mechanism. In hindsight, it is now clear that during this time something other than valuation was driving stock prices. That something was an irrational exhuberance for the thin air of high flying techs. Understanding that your Yield at Cost was rising every year, may have given you enough incentive not to go chasing tech stocks that were trading at 200 and 300 times earnings.

As shown in columns B and C, BAC’s earnings and dividends have had average annual growth of 9.1% and 14.4%, respectively. This is excellent growth, particularly in dividends. Column D shows that BAC’s dividend payout has averaged 39.4% of earnings per share. Column D also shows that the dividend payout ratio has been rising significantly – with dividends representing about 30% of earnings ten years ago and about 50% today. This is graphic evidence of a board of directors that is able and willing to return to its shareholders a fair cut of the profits. Column E shows that BAC has experienced price growth of 12% per year, which is similar to dividend growth, as is often the case with rising dividend stocks. To determine the average annual total return, we add the average annual dividend yield of 3.45% to the average annual price increase of 12% to arrive at 15.45%.

There is much good information on Table 1, but, as they say, the past results are no guarantee of the future, let us cite two points that tell us BAC’s prospects for the next ten years are sound.

1. Growing Earnings: It is not well understood that the US economy has been growing on average about 7% a year for the last 50 years. If you are a closet economist you will fuss and say that the economy has grown at only 3% a year. But both numbers are correct. The more widely accepted figure of 3% annual growth is adjusted for inflation, which has averaged 4% per year during this time, and measures real economic growth. But the 7% figure is also correct because it is the actual or gross rate of economic growth not adjusted for inflation. Since stock prices and other corporate financial data are not adjusted for inflation, an apples to apples comparison calls for us to use the 7% growth rate.

BAC is as close to being a nationwide banking operation as any financial institution we have in this country. If the US economy continues to expand at a gross rate of 7% per year, it is not a stretch of the imagination to predict that BAC will also grow earnings at least at 7% annually for the next decade.

2. Precedents for a Continued Rising Dividend: So, BAC has a bright future. That does not mean its dividends will keep pace with its earnings. How can we be sure that the company’s board of directors will continue to give us our cut? The short answer is we don’t know. We believe the best way to judge a company’s likelihood of being fair to its shareholders is to look for precedents from its past. In this case, we mean dividend decisions they made when things were tough. There is a powerful precedent-setting action contained in Table 1.

In 1998, BAC’s earnings fell nearly 20% versus the prior year. Remarkably, BAC, showing their unquestioned financial strength, raised their dividend by nearly 14%. We see three good things to take from their actions:

A. They correctly saw that the troubles of the time were temporary.

B. They did not make a token dividend increase; they raised their dividend at the same rate as they had been doing prior to the earnings weakness.

C. Their strategic actions prior to 1998 created a strong financial condition that allowed them to handle the rough spot with ease. (Thus, the importance of the “Quality Door.”)

Donaldson Capital Management has been using a dividend oriented investment approach since our founding. Dividend investing, a we practice it, is suited for those people who want their investments to be safe, to provide much higher than average cash flows, and over time to provide capital gains comparable to the blue chip averages with much less volatility.

Next time I will discuss the long-term statistical correlations between dividend growth and price growth. I think you will be surprised at the findings.

Blessings,


*All data shown here is taken from sources believed to reliable. DCM cannot guarantee their accuracy. Data may not total correctly due to rounding.

Friday, April 15, 2005

A Brief History of Donaldson Capital Management

Years ending in five have special significance to Donaldson Capital Management. In 1975, I (Greg) left Indiana Bell and joined a small Indianapolis-based bond firm, Traub and Company. In 1985, I entered the money management business for the first time, when I helped start Raffensperger, Hughes Investment Advisors (RHIA). A decade later in 1995, I formed Donaldson Capital Management. If you have done your math, that means I am celebrating three anniversaries this year: thirty years in the investment business, twenty years in the investment management business, and ten years in the firm bearing my name. A handful of you reading this letter have celebrated all of these anniversaries with me, others have been aboard for a shorter time, and many of you are new arrivals whom I have yet to meet. To all of you, and those who have gone before us, I want to say thank you. You have been a blessing to my family and me. You have taught me the wonder of how trust is formed in a world too full of doubt and betrayal. I thank God everyday for the privilege of serving you.

At the occasion of these multiple anniversaries, I wanted to share some of the milestones along the way that have marked and shaped the firm we are today. Although the early part of this story is mostly about my experiences in the investment business, the DCM story has moved far beyond me. Indeed, President, Mike Hull, and Vice-President of Operations, Laura Roop, run the day-to-day business. I serve as the Director of Portfolio Strategy and one of the portfolio managers.

1975 – Thirty Years Ago

When I joined Traub and Company in 1975, OPEC had just dramatically raised oil prices, stocks were in a steep decline, and inflation was exploding. To top it off, Traub and Company dealt mainly in bonds, which were about to start their worst bear market in history. None of these impediments slowed the firm a bit. Traub was full of young people in their 30s and 40s, who were incredibly focused, hard working, and collectively knew bonds better than any group of people I have ever known. We were all TnT people. We each covered a territory; we left every Tuesday morning to visit clients and returned Thursday afternoon. We called on banks, insurance companies, municipalities, and wealthy individuals – what we called professional buyers. They joked about my territory. It extended from Louisville to St. Louis and south all the way to the Gulf of Mexico. My road warrior life improved dramatically when I opened an office in Evansville, which was three hours closer to my territory than was Indianapolis.

Traub believed that to know bonds, cold, you had to know the economy, cold or hot, and they did. There are still dozens of former Traub employees inhabiting the major bond houses throughout the Midwest and South. I have maintained relationships with many of these people, and today Donaldson Capital Management buys many of its bonds from these old fashioned bond guys.

Traub knew bonds, but they were the first to admit they were not experts in stocks. In the early 1980s, I became convinced that Fed Chairman Paul Volker would tame the runaway inflation, creating a good environment for stocks, which had languished for years. I tried to convince Mr. Traub that we should build some know-how in high quality stocks, not just local issues, as was the case then. He acknowledged that a better stock market was coming, but the firm’s expertise was in bonds, and the company was already growing as fast as he felt was safe. With this in mind, I started looking around for a firm that knew stocks but also possessed a solid bond department. As I searched, I kept hearing the name Gene Tanner. He was the president of Raffensperger, Hughes, which was just down the street from Traub. Tanner was reputed to be the biggest broker in Indianapolis, and he also ran a respected firm. At first, I shied away from talking with him because he had such a big reputation in the industry. However, after interviewing a half dozen firms, including two on Wall Street, it became clear to me that if I wanted to learn from the best and stay in the Midwest, Gene Tanner was the guy to talk to.

When I met with Mr. Tanner, I told him about my desire to learn more about stocks, and asked him if I joined his firm would he help me learn. He laughed and said he would do what he could, but lately he had been thinking he needed to find someone who could teach him. I remember thinking how odd that was coming from someone with his reputation. But if I thought that was odd, what he said next was almost shocking. As we were wrapping up our meeting, I asked him if he would mind sharing with me what he thought was responsible for the success of his firm. He sat back in his chair, folded his hands, looked out the window, and said, “Being a nice person goes a long way.” And then he added, “In the long run, this business rewards honesty and integrity.”

I joined Mr. Tanner in 1981, and in some ways, I still work for him to this day. His self-deprecating way and humility are genuine and have never changed. The best news, however, is that he is still teaching me about stocks and the ways of Wall Street. This year he celebrates his 47th year in the investment business, as Vice-Chairman of NatCity Investments.

1985 – 20 Years Ago

In 1985, I served as the Director of Sales and Marketing for Raffensperger, Hughes. During the year, I worked closely with Gene on a strategic plan. The stock market was strong and bond yields were falling. I argued that the time was right for Raffensperger to start a portfolio management division. There were only a handful of true money management firms in our area, and I believed that professional management of stocks would become increasingly desirable for wealthy individuals. I cited some statistics of the time showing that in the late 1960s individuals had over 40% of their assets in stocks or mutual funds. That figure had fallen to only about 20% in the mid-1980s. The extremely high interest rates of the 1970s and early 1980s had pulled huge dollars out of stocks into bonds. Now, however, with bond yields falling rapidly, people would be pushed back to stocks, especially since President Reagan had lowered capital gains taxes. My strongest argument was this: Managing a million dollar portfolio of stocks was not possible for most people. There were just too many variables in purchase and sell decisions, and the markets were too volatile. Individual investors might have a fighting chance to develop bond management skills, but to do so in stocks called for intense study and experience, something that could get very expensive for a novice to learn.

After only a few meetings, he blessed my idea of starting a money management division, and late in 1985 Raffensperger Hughes Investment Advisors (RHIA) was born. I was the first senior officer, and by early 1986, I had assembled a small team to market our services and manage portfolios. By the middle of 1987, RHIA’s assets had grown to $30 million. Our growth had been greatly helped by stocks being up nearly 45% in the first six months of the year. That was about to change in a way no one could have imagined. At that time RHIA used what we called a B-I-G investment strategy. We invested in Big companies that were Industries leaders and whose earnings were Growing. Our buy and sell disciplines were momentum driven: ride your winners, cut your losers.

October 19, 1987, Black Monday, was surreal, agonizing, devastating, and yet, in some ways the best thing that ever happened to me. On that one day, the Dow Jones fell 23.7%, which would be equivalent to about 2500 points today. For the month of October 1987, the Dow fell nearly 30%. I wrote in my journal that I felt like the school bus driver who lost control of his bus and drove it over the cliff, losing all the children in the neighborhood.

In the days immediately following the crash, I talked with every client we had many times, trying to reassure them, but by the end of the week, I was listening to what I was saying to see if I could reassure myself. Since I had no internal compass to tell me what a stock was really worth, did I have the right to encourage people to stay in the market? Weren’t stock prices efficient, in the sense that there were millions of buyers and sellers making educated guesses about the prospects for the company? Didn’t today’s price reflect the net best guess of what the company was worth? As I said earlier, in those days, I was a momentum stock investor, and now the momentum was straight down. Yet, something inside me said the right thing to do was to buy.

The main reason for this feeling was prompted by a telephone call with a bond salesman. He explained that he needed a bid on some Indiana University bonds for a customer who insisted on selling. He said the bond market had frozen up about like the stock market. My recollection is that he had about $200,000 of the bonds and needed to sell them by the end of the day. I had a general idea of what the bonds were worth, and I had no fears of Indiana University defaulting. They were safe. Interest rates had been going through the roof in recent weeks, but the stock market crash had produced a flight to safety, causing bond prices to begin to rally. The toughest part of the IU bond was that it matured in 30 years. After thinking about it, I realized come heck or high water, if I could buy the bonds to yield 10%, I had a real bargain.
I called the guy, gave him my price, and he took it.

That night as I lay in bed, I was both enlightened and indicted. I knew how to value a bond, and even in this difficult time, I knew a good value when I saw one, and I could step up to the plate and buy it. But when it came to stocks, I had no similar way to compute intrinsic value, and not having this, I was forced to wait for the dust to clear before I got back in the market. The best I could do was to identify those companies whose financial strength and brands would likely carry them through these uncertain times.
I vowed that I would find a way to determine intrinsic value, and the next time the market was throwing away good companies at bad prices, I would be a buyer instead of a watcher. What I found in my long search for a method to determine the intrinsic value of a company has changed my whole attitude about stocks. Today, I believe the market regularly overreacts both up and down, and patiently “waiting for your price” is rewarded.

RHIA survived the crash of 1987; indeed, we seemed to have benefited from it. In the wake of the crash, almost all the brokers and clients at Raffensperger, Hughes were totally confused. Since we were the firm’s money managers, it seemed only right that we would be called on to make sense of what was going on. We spoke on daily conference calls, calls with important clients, and fielded hundreds of questions from our money management clients. We told everyone who would listen the truth as we believed it to be: stocks were probably overpriced heading into the crash, but Black Monday was a financial accident caused by computerized trading at big Wall Street firms. We explained that the economy appeared to be relatively unaffected, so earnings should hold together. But, we concluded that the stock market was unlikely to quickly regain the losses it had sustained until investors were confident that such an accident would not happen again. As it turned out, most of our assessment of what had caused Black Monday was on target, but the market turned around much faster than we had guessed. In 1988, the S&P 500 grew by almost 17%. Our forecast was for less than half that figure. Why did the market turn so quickly? The main reason was that the biggest, most knowledgeable investors already understood that stocks had intrinsic value and how to compute it. Thus, they knew America was on sale at bargain prices and they bought.

From 1988 through 1993 RHIA’s clients and assets grew rapidly. We returned to our B-I-G investment strategy and our performance exceeded the benchmarks for the period. We did start a “value style” of investment management that used dividend-paying stocks, but it had few assets and no real emphasis. The rapid growth, in retrospect, was not a blessing. We found that we did not have the people or the systems to accommodate the growth, which caused our level of customer service to fall dramatically. I personally had more complaints of poor service during that time than at any time in my career. The complaints caught me by surprise, because our investment performance had been good, and I had always thought that was priority #1. I was about to learn the rest of the story, good client service might be hard for people to describe, but they know it when they are not getting it.

But the news would get worse. Our rapid growth had caught the eye of The Associated Group, a large affiliate of Blue Cross-Blue Shield, who owned Raffensperger, Hughes. The Associated Group spun RHIA out of Raffensperger, Hughes, merged it with their investment department, and renamed the entity Anthem Capital Management. RHIA had about $160 million of assets under management and eight employees before the merger. The new entity had over $2 billion under management and over 80 employees. Anthem started a trust company and a family of mutual funds, including a rising dividend fund that I managed. I had long believed that trusts, mutual funds, and investment management were natural partners. With these three service offerings, a large firm like Anthem could provide investment management to almost anyone. We were one of the first non-bank companies in the nation to put these three investment products under one roof. I have always said that Anthem got the “head” part of the business right, but they forgot the “heart.”

That deficiency in matters of the heart became increasingly apparent, and in short order, I knew that Anthem was not for me. One of the first indications was a change in our motto. RHIA’s motto of Discipline, Patience, and Humility was discarded as too corny. The beginning of our mission statement, which hung on the wall in our entry way, was changed from, “. . .[O]ur ultimate business is trust” to “[We] will earn a return on equity consistent with the leading firms. . .” The next clue came when a brochure appeared on my desk with a long quote attributed to me. The quote was not mine, and it was not something I would ever say. The final straw occurred in October of 1994 at our weekly investment strategy meeting. My title was Director of Economic Strategy. My primary responsibility was to develop an investment strategy for managing our bonds and other interest-sensitive securities. At the weekly investment strategy meeting I provided an overview of the economy and Federal Reserve policy and set guidelines for the quality and length of maturity of the bonds that we were buying.

1994 had been a tough year for bonds. Inflation had ticked up and the Fed was aggressively pushing interest rates higher. In December of 1993, long-term treasury bonds had yielded 5.75%, but here in October they yielded over 8%. I had been saying for several months that interest rates were much higher than they should be, based on historical relationships with inflation, and I expected them to fall. For this reason, I was advocating buying long-term bonds. Setting interest rate policy was my call. It was subject to debate, and everyone had an opportunity to offer their own views, but in the end, my job description said I set the policy. The debate at that October meeting was not pretty. I was reminded of having been wrong about the market for several months, believing too much in Alan Greenspan, and being bullheaded about it. Everyone is entitled to their opinions, but I knew few of the other five members of the investment policy committee had any idea where interest rates were going. They were mostly worried because bond prices had been falling for months, and indeed, they were starting to catch some worried questions from our clients. I had learned a lot about bonds and the economy from my days at Traub, but I had learned something even more valuable for negotiating tough times from Gene Tanner. He had always said, “Get the fundamentals right. In the short run, prices can go anywhere, and they will; but in the long run, they will follow the fundamentals. If you don’t have the fundamentals right, you’ll faint when you should be fighting.” There was no doubt in my mind that I had the fundamentals right, and therefore, I was not about to change my opinion to appease the other members of the committee, who I thought were in the process of fainting.

Because my view was seen to be in the minority, the chairman decided to take a vote. I do not know if he realized it, but in taking the vote on something that was clearly my decision, on a de facto basis, I was being relieved of my authority. Among the six votes, mine was the only one for my recommendation. As I looked around the room, I realized I had been outvoted by fear. Almost everyone had advanced degrees in business, one even had a national reputation, but I knew fear was whispering in their ears and not the principles of economics that they had learned.

1995 – 10 Years Ago

Donaldson Capital Management was conceived that same day on the long drive home to Evansville. It may seem as though I was responding like a sore loser, but there was something inside of me that was elevated more than my ire. It was as though I was lifted above the situation and saw it for what it was, and what I saw troubled me: I did not trust these people. They had put words in my mouth on the brochure and acted like it was nothing. They had rewritten the mission statement to put their own rate of return as their #1 priority, rather than their clients’ well being. But, most troubling to me was the realization that on this day they had bushwhacked one of their own.

At moments like these, it pays to have a friend and mentor like Gene Tanner. When Anthem Capital had been spun out of Raffensperger Hughes, he had remained as Raffensperger’s president. We had spent only a few minutes discussing the situation, when he said, “Come back here and start your own firm. You can do it, and I’ll help you. We’ve got extra space and technology. Just bring your own people and you’re in business.” Roughly 60 days later it was done . . . about the same time interest rates started a downtrend that would last almost 10 years. Within a year, almost all the people who had gone to Anthem from RHIA had left.

One of the first thoughts I had upon the forming of Donaldson Capital Management was how to get Mike Hull to leave Bristol Myers and join me. Mike was my best friend, and I had been recruiting him for a decade; but his ship just kept getting farther away from me, as he rose in the ranks of Bristol’s Mead Johnson Nutritionals division. After a two-year stint in China, he was now the Marketing Director for infant formula, a billion dollar plus product line. Mike and I had met on a three-day spiritual retreat in 1982, and even though we did not know each other, he and his family started attending our church shortly thereafter. Our kids became best friends first, and that led to our families beginning to spend time together at church and socially. I really got to know him over many years of walking the beach at Destin, Florida, where our families vacationed together each fall during the 1980s.

I had been recruiting Mike for such a long time because he had been in the investment management business earlier in his career, and before joining Bristol Myers, he had been the president of a small health-care products company. From all of those walks along the beach, I knew the job he had enjoyed the most was running the small firm. Our families had celebrated the year he was able to get his company’s eye-care solutions in Wal-Mart and Walgreen. I knew he had left the company to go to Bristol Myers mainly for the security a large firm offered his young family. But that security was coming at a stiff price. As he had moved higher in the organization, the choices were becoming less attractive: continue moving up and give the company more of his life or sit still and wait for Bristol to say they no longer needed him, like they were doing with so many others.

Most people knew Mike, at that time, as a bright and competitive executive, but I knew the brightest thing about him was his heart. I knew countless examples where Mike had gone out of his way to help someone in need, but there was one incident that I stumbled onto that left me speechless. I saw him in the cloak room of our church one Sunday after the service with two big bags of groceries. It was early summer and I knew of no food drives or church functions that would require him to bring groceries to church, so I asked him where the food was going. After some stalling, he finally admitted that he was taking the food to someone he had met in our Christmas food drive. He said, “You know, it occurred to me that that guy might get hungry at times other than Christmas.” Then he turned and left.

It was that heart that I wanted to work along side of and learn from. It was that heart, and the head that came with it, that I wanted to manage our little firm.

King Traub was the head of Traub and Company. He was a bigger-than-life type of character, and a genius at salesmanship. I can still hear him say, “No is not an answer that means no forever. It just means not now. Ask tomorrow and again next week, and keep asking until they tell you don’t ask again. Then ask them when you can ask again.”

I had followed King’s counsel to the letter in trying to hire Mike. He had told me no for a decade, but I knew his job with Bristol was wearing on him, so I decided to try him again. My sales pitch to Mike was simple: Come and join me. I will take care of the investments; you take care of running the firm. We will become as big as you decide. I can offer you about half of your present salary, but I can provide you with security that you will never have at Bristol Myers, because at Bristol, there will always come a day when they say goodbye, and that will never happen with me (I had borrowed this line of thinking from him). We need to add people. How many is up to you, and you have to figure out how to pay for them, but we need to grow. To my surprise he said yes. I remember saying something like, “Are you sure? You’d be giving up a lot of income.” (King would not have been proud of this approach.) He explained that he was sure, but he had some things that he needed to finish at Mead Johnson, and he could not join me for a year.

Mike joined our firm in February of 1997. He said he would like to study our business, the industry, and get to know our clients before he officially started to run the company. Near the end of 1997, he said he was ready to talk. The following is an excerpt of what he shared during the next few weeks:

There is a disconnect between what our industry thinks is most important to the clients and what the clients think. The Financial Services industry thinks that investment performance is the most important ingredient, but the clients think it is a trusting relationship and good service. Put another way, Wall Street thinks it’s all about how smart or savvy they are -- the head -- while what the clients want is someone who cares – the heart. To make matters worse, Wall Street keeps the investment selection process a closely guarded secret, shrouded in mystery and complexity, which has the effect of holding clients at arms length, when the client’s want to feel like they are a part of the process.

But the clients also are making a mistake. In their desire to find a trusting relationship, they often sacrifice a lot in investment performance. In essence, they pay too high a price for service and simplicity. The best examples of this are Certificates of Deposit and Fixed Annuities. These financial products are simple, usually sold by someone the clients knows, and do not fluctuate in price. What could be wrong with this? Nothing, if you are trying to share the wealth, but plenty if you are trying to live off of your assets for the rest of your life. Based on historical returns, at the rate of inflation, money will double in about 20 years, compared with almost an eight-fold increase in common stocks and almost a four-fold increase in corporate bonds.

Investors deserve a new model for financial services relationships. Let’s call it a heart and head strategy. The number one priority of our firm should be client satisfaction. To the clients that means a trusting relationship and good service. The way to accomplish this is to build a staff of people whose sole function is to respond to our clients’ questions, needs and concerns. These people should not be clerks. They should be smart, well-trained, friendly, and possess a servant’s heart. Our clients should be almost surprised by how well they are treated and how knowledgeable these client services people are. The goal should be to have our client services people on a first name basis with every client we have and be able to handle their needs on the first call. The heart of our business, unlike most investment firms, will be trust building through surprisingly good customer service.

Next, we must make the head part of our business, the investment process, more understandable and more transparent. We need to get our heads out of the investment clouds, look our clients in the eyes, and tell them what we are doing and why. We need to let them look over our shoulders and help them to see what we see. We need to show them that, even though what we do may not be simple, it is sensible, understandable, and has solid prospects for success. We should teach our clients the basics of how to value a company so that when increased volatility inevitably comes, they can see through it to the true value of a company, and not be drawn in or pushed out at precisely the wrong moment.

For these reasons, we should place more emphasis on the Dividend Strategy. There are very few people who have gone as far into dividends as you have, and I am convinced that the dividend strategy produces investment returns as good as or better than the market with far less volatility. But if we keep it to ourselves, we are doing the same thing that everybody else in the Financial Services industry is doing: mystifying the investment process and keeping our clients at arm’s length. If we are a heart-first company, we need to share what we have learned about dividends, especially as it relates to determining what a company is worth. For our clients’ wellbeing as well as our own, we need to teach them that the current selling price of a stock is almost never what it is really worth. We have simply got to get them out of the business of valuing their portfolios using their monthly statements or a website. There is very little correlation between what a company is selling for today and what it will be selling for next year or five years from now. On the contrary, we know in many cases, there is an 80%-90% correlation between dividend growth and price in a year or five years. In every way we can, we must get this information out to our clients and help them understand it.

Mike concluded with a far-reaching thought. “Over the next twenty years, more people than ever before will be retiring with a fixed sum of money that must last them the rest of their lives. Unless they become investors instead of speculators, and unless they learn how to invest for income as opposed to purely capital gains, retirement will be a nightmare for them. Our job is to reach them and share our story.

Over the past six years, we have been implementing Mike’s strategy for our firm. We promoted Laura Roop to Vice President of Operations and Client Services. Carol Stumpf is now the Director of Client Services. Laura and Carol, along with their fellow teammates, Tom Piper, Beth Dietsch, and Ciavon Fetcher, are the people Mike envisioned who would possess good heads and great hearts. All of these people have been with us for at least four years. Rick Roop, Laura’s husband, joined us as a third portfolio manager, and we are talking to yet another candidate. We have added a technology specialist to our staff, and we have added software that helps us measure the quantity and quality of our client interactions. We have simplified our investment management styles, and now everything we do in stocks is dividend oriented. We have written extensively about our ongoing dividend research and tried hard to make this understandable to our clients, new and old. Finally, we have added a process that assures each of our portfolios is as close to our “best idea” model portfolio as possible.

Today, Donaldson Capital Management serves nearly 300 families in 28 states and the District of Columbia with total assets approaching $300 million. Indiana continues to be the state where we have the most clients, but we have a growing presence in Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Arkansas, Alabama, and Florida. We have relationships with over 40 brokers throughout these areas who refer business to us. Brokers in the South have been referring clients at such a pace that we plan on opening an office in either Nashville or Birmingham, during the next quarter.

That is the Donaldson Capital Management story as of today. I am very confident that there will be many more chapters in the coming years. I have said little about the role clients have played in our history. Many of you have humbled us with your unfailing trust in the tough times we have faced together. You have sent your friends to talk with us, your children, and your children’s children. You have honored us by asking us to help you work through difficult estate questions. We hold no illusions that we built this company with our own hands. Our clients’ fingerprints are all over everything we do. Even the idea to start a portfolio management company in 1985 came from a client. I also want to recognize the great contributions made by former partners, Tom Lynch and Wayne Ramsey. We rode together for many years, and they added immeasurably to my understanding of both investments, as well as the investment business.